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I. Renewed Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Cooperation
In January 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Singapore and
signed the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement. Then he
stressed the need for strengthening a sincere and open partnership between
Japan and ASEAN and proposed what he called the Japan-ASEAN
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (JACEP).1
In September 2002, ASEAN Economic Ministers and Minister of
Economy, Trade, and Industry of Japan (AEM-METI) met in Brunei and
jointly recommended that the leaders “commence consideration of a
framework that would provide a basis for concrete plans and elements
towards realizing the JACEP in accordance with its guiding principles,
such as the comprehensiveness of countries and sectors,” that “the
framework should be developed and its outcome presented to the Leaders
in the year 2003 for their consideration,” and that “the implementation of
measures for the realization of the partnership, including elements of a
possible FTA, should be completed as soon as possible within 10 years
while according due consideration to the economic levels and sensitive
sectors of each country.”2 The leaders met in Cambodia in November 2002
and endorsed the recommendation. A committee of senior economic
officials of ASEAN and Japan was established in March 2003 to hammer
out further details.
In support of this JACEP initiative at the governmental level, the
Institute of Developing Economies (IDE)/JETRO of Japan and research
institutes of five ASEAN member countries (the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies of Indonesia, the Malaysian Institute of
Economic Research, the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, the
Singapore Institute of International Affairs, and the Thailand Development
Research Institute) start a new joint study program on the current state of
their industrial upgrading and strategy for enhancing international
competitiveness. This also meets Prime Minister Koizumi’s suggestion of
“strengthen[ing] the network that links research institutions in Japan and
ASEAN countries.”3 We, the Japan-ASEAN Research Institute Meeting
(JARIM), aim to work out the vision of JACEP and further details for its
action agenda in parallel with governmental efforts. JARIM met for the
first time in Bangkok in October 2002. In July 2003, the ASEAN-Japan
Exchange Year, an expanded meeting in Tokyo included Brunei and
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) as well. The joint study
report (attached to this volume) was input to the AEM-METI in September
2003.4
Table 1.1
ASEAN-Japan Relationship in the Last Three Decades
1977 Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda has met with ASEAN leaders at the
Second ASEAN Summit Meeting.
1992 The AEM-METI between ASEAN and Japan has been held every year.
2000 Sep. The Japan-Singapore Joint Study Group Report.
2001 Oct. The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) has
completed negotiation.
2002 Jan. JSEPA is concluded.
The Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership (JACEP) has
proposed.
Sep. The AEM-METI recommended the leaders to commence consideration of a
framework.
Nov. The leaders has signed a joint declaration of JACEP.
2003 Mar. The JACEP Committee has set up.
Oct. The framework of JACEP is agreed.
2004 Consultation of the JACEP.
2005 Negotiation of the JACEP.
2012 Completion of the JACEP between the original ASEAN six members and
Japan.
2015 Completion of the JACEP between the newer ASEAN members and Japan.
Source: Compiled from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
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II. Japan-ASEAN Relationship: Overview
Figure 1.1 provides a map of East Asia showing Japan and the ten ASEAN
members, giving the population and per capita GDP of each for 2002. A
big difference in size and living standards can be seen between Japan,
Singapore, and Brunei at the high end, other original ASEAN members in
the middle, and CLMV at the low end.
Japan and the ASEAN members have been close economic partners for
more than three decades. The ASEAN members accelerated their
Figure 1.1
Map of East Asia
Population (million) and GDP per capita (US$) in 2002
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003.
ASEAN Secretariat ‹http://www.aseansec.org/macroeconomic/aq_gdp22.htm›
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development in the 1970s and achieved a decade of “miraculous growth”
from 1987 to 1996. Japanese firms participated through active direct
investments and import trade. The ASEAN economies suffered a severe
setback from the Asian crisis of 1997-98, but they have recovered more
quickly than anticipated. However, their structural deficiencies remain yet
to be remedied.
Recent advancement of the Chinese economy and Chinese firms has
also caused a feeling of uneasiness and threat among the rest of East
Asia. Although the majority view China’s dynamism as a strong engine
supporting East Asian development and believe other economies will
benefit from it, there have emerged persistent requests for restrictive
measures and protection against “the Chinese threat” from sectors and
firms directly competing with China. A major economic policy issue
shared by many ASEAN member economies is how to promote the
upgrading of their industrial structure and enhance the international
competitiveness of their industries.
However, the rise of China is a recent phenomenon, and China’s trade
relations with ASEAN and Japan have not matched those between Japan
and ASEAN. Table 1.2 shows the trade flow among Japan, ASEAN, and
China in 1990 and 2000. China-ASEAN trade was only 10 percent as large
as Japan-ASEAN trade in 1990 but had risen to 25 percent by 2000.
China-Japan trade quadrupled for the decade, but it still remained at one-
third or one-half the volume of Japan-ASEAN trade. Table 1.3 shows
trade-intensity indexes calculated from trade flow shown in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2
Trade Flow among Japan, ASEAN, and China
(million US$)
from to Japan ASEAN* China
Japan
1990 32,066 6,145
2000 68,186 30,356
ASEAN
1990 27,000 27,500 2,268
2000 55,945 93,075 16,179
China
1990 9,327 3,493
2000 41,654 16,633
Source: Institute for International Trade and Investment.
Note: *Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
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Trade intensity of intra-ASEAN trade was as high as 4. The intensity of
Japan-ASEAN trade remained stable at around 2.5, while the intensity of
China-ASEAN trade was just a little more than 1 (average intensity). The
intensity of Japan-China trade almost doubled. In particular, the intensity
of Japan’s imports from China exceeded that of Japan-ASEAN trade.
The content of the trade among the three highlights the important fact
that, while ASEAN and China compete in their major exports, Japan is
complementary with both ASEAN and China. Figure 1.2 is borrowed from
our ASEAN-Japan Competitive Strategy.5 The curves illustrate changes
over time in export-import ratios in major commodities, along which
countries in different stages of industrial development are plotted. The ratio
starts with minus 1 when a new industry starts, increases and exceeds 0
(which means “becomes a net exporter”), reaches +1 and then turns
downward, representing “flying geese development of a new industry in
a late-starting country.” The United States and Japan are on the down slope
for all three commodities, while Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore just pass
the peak in PCs and their peripherals, reaching the peak in household
electrical appliances, and are already on the down slope in apparel.
However, ASEAN4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand)
and China are in the same group, still below 0 in household electrical
appliances, increasing above 0 in PCs, and around the peak in apparel.
A complaint is often heard in ASEAN that Japanese investment goes
to China, accelerating China’s rise while leaving ASEAN behind. This is
also contrary to fact. Table 1.4 shows Japanese foreign direct investment
(FDI) in individual East Asian countries as well as in the European Union
Table 1.3
Trade Intensity Index
from to Japan ASEAN* China
Japan
1990 2.33 1.29
2000 2.52 1.91
ASEAN
1990 2.77 4.17 0.99
2000 2.49 3.92 1.16
China
1990 1.99 1.10
2000 3.13 1.18
Source: Institute for International Trade and Investment.
Note: *Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
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(EU) and the U.S., both in accumulated stock for 1951-2002 and for the
recent five-year period of 1998-2002. In total stock Japan’s FDI in
ASEAN6 is 3.3 times as much as that in China. For 1998-2002, while
Japanese FDI in China increased rapidly, that in ASEAN6 tended to
decrease but was still 2.7 times as much as that in China.
This year six original ASEAN members will complete the AFTA
liberalization on schedule, reducing tariffs below 5 percent except for a
limited number of sensitive items. New ASEAN members will follow
suit: Vietnam by 2006, Laos and Myanmar by 2008, and Cambodia by
2010. The completion of AFTA will achieve the single integrated ASEAN
market and allow existing firms, both indigenous and foreign, more
efficient intra-ASEAN specialization and strengthen the competitiveness
Table 1.4
Outward Direct Investment by Japanese Firms
(FY1951-2002/FY1998-2002 accumulated)
(Million US$)
1951-2002
1998−2002
Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing Total
China 16,526 6,570 23,757 6,053
ASEAN6 43,748 34,107 79,263 16,416
Indonesia 11,869 14,875 26,859 3,345
Thailand 11,173 4,087 16,216 4,522
Malaysia 7,379 2,500 9,910 1,616
Philippines 4,863 2,307 7,252 2,635
Singapore 7,375 10,123 17,650 3,990
Vietnam 1,090 215 1,376 309
Other major Asian
economies 12,709 22,930 37,253 12,029
Hong Kong 2,737 16,982 20,250 3,035
Korea 5,056 4,099 9,861 3,286
Taiwan 4,916 1,849 7,142 1,718
United States 112,234 204,973 319,206 59,352
Europe 60,093 143,844 207,072 90,043
World total 282,473 547,821 841,784 224,787
Source: Ministry of Finance of Japan, Foreign Direct Investment, compiled by JETRO.
Note: Total contains investment for branch.
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of ASEAN as a whole. It will also encourage more foreign firms to invest
within ASEAN.
In contrast, Japan is now finishing a decade-long stagnation. Although
competition has heated up in labor-intensive manufacturing and some
agricultural production with China, Japanese industries are by and large
complementary to those of China and ASEAN. Japan wishes to see both
Chinese and ASEAN firms avoid excessive competition and achieve
mutually beneficial complementary relationships. Japan has offered a wide
variety of technical cooperation either bilaterally or through multilateral
frameworks such as APEC and the AEM-METI Economic and Industrial
Cooperation Committee (AMEICC). AMEICC has implemented eight
working groups on human resource development, SMEs/support
industries, the auto industry, the chemical industry, etc. JETRO has been
participating in some of this with technical assistance, and IDE has
supported these efforts through research and surveys.6
III. Vision of the Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive
Economic Partnership
What is the vision of JACEP? Unfortunately it does not seem that
Japan’s intention when proposing JACEP has been well understood by its
ASEAN counterparts. Some say that Japan was spurred into action by the
Chinese approach to ASEAN and hastily came up with a proposal of its
own, which would neither reach the level of an FTA nor benefit ASEAN
exporters of agricultural products, because Japan is not ready to open up
its food market. We have to show a clear vision and agenda of action of
JACEP. JARIM aims to produce these things in collaboration between
Japan and ASEAN. The following elements should be incorporated:
First, JACEP aims for an FTA between Japan and ASEAN as a
whole, contrary to the traditional pattern of bilateral cooperation between
Japan and individual ASEAN members. The original ASEAN members
will complete the first stage of AFTA (reducing common effective tariffs
below 5 percent within ASEAN except for a limited number of sensitive
items) within 2003, and the new members will follow suit in three to seven
years, when the single ASEAN market is completed. The FTA between
Japan and the single ASEAN market will generate new business
opportunities for both Japanese and ASEAN firms. For example, Japan’s
FTA with Laos alone will not induce Japanese firms to invest in Laos,
since it has a very small domestic market. However, a Japan-ASEAN FTA
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will make that a less important factor when considering Laos as a
manufacturing venue than whatever comparative advantages the country
has to offer (say, cheap electricity), since the “domestic” market becomes
the whole of ASEAN.
Second, ASEAN member governments have to change their trade/
investment policies and industrial policies from their traditional pattern of
import restrictions and export subsidies to ones of more market
competition toward the single ASEAN market. They have to convert
cheap-labor assembly production of low added value based on imported
parts and materials to upgraded production in line with their own
comparative advantages based on their own domestic support industries.
Our ASEAN-Japan Competitive Strategy is aimed at encouraging ASEAN
members to identify own comparative advantages. The promotion of trade
and investment liberalization and domestic structural reform is inevitable
in order to enhance trade and cross-border investment among member
economies. Liberalization and structural reform basically depend on self-
help efforts, but they tend to make little headway because of resistance
from entrenched domestic interests. Joint implementation of liberalization
and reform in a comprehensive FTA framework will help individual
governments persuade their nationals with external commitments.
Third, Japan must show its ASEAN counterparts how the on-going
reform of its industry and corporate structure will affect its trade and FDI
to neighbor economies. They want to know what impact a Japan-ASEAN
FTA will have on Japanese investment in ASEAN. Japan should depart
from its traditional approach of excluding agriculture and start talking
about securing a stable supply of safe food from ASEAN.
Fourth, in the single integrated ASEAN there will still remain a big
difference in living standards and stage of industrial development between
the six original members and CLMV. New ASEAN members have much
lower per capita income than do the original members and are handicapped
in infrastructure, human resources, technology, and capital endowments.
In November 2000 ASEAN leaders established the Initiative for ASEAN
Integration (IAI), under which the original ASEAN members are extending
technical assistance to new members in human resource development. The
specific and differential treatment of merely allowing longer periods of
implementation is not sufficient to make up the difference, and these
ASEAN members need a “regional program” like the one implemented by
the EU to enable late starters to overcome their handicaps. Japan is
currently giving bilateral official development assistance (ODA) to CLMV
and, if combined with human and physical resources from the original
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ASEAN members, it will be expanded to become an ASEAN-wide
assistance program. It will encourage CLMV to participate in JACEP and
strengthen solidarity within ASEAN.
IV. Cooperation Network in East Asia
The Japanese government has started consultations on bilateral FTAs with
Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia after Singapore. Bilateral FTAs are
a pragmatic approach to taking advantage of increased momentum for
achieving higher integration among prepared members. However, bilateral
FTAs are subject to limited gain from economy of scale, as stated above,
and members not included will be left behind. It is very necessary to
promote JACEP in parallel with the bilateral FTA negotiations. The
members outside these FTAs will also feel a need to participate in JACEP
so as not to be left behind.
Though taking FTAs as a realistic approach, what happens to the future
of East Asia? Would it be able to achieve prosperity placing East Asia as
one pole among the three poles with Europe and America? The bilateral,
multilateral, and East Asia FTA plans are complex. Among them, the
competitive liberalization that China and Japan are requesting through
FTAs is remarkable. At the ASEAN+3 Summit meeting in Phnom Penh
in November 2002, China and ASEAN signed a comprehensive economic
cooperation framework, and both agreed on completing an FTA plan by
2010-2015. Japan and ASEAN agreed on aiming at an FTA at the earliest
occasion within ten years. Although China promised early liberalization
of eight agricultural products such as perishable vegetables, fruits and
ornamental plants, Japan is deliberate in its liberalization of agricultural
products.
However, whilst both Japan and China pursue FTA negotiations with
ASEAN, neither has proposed a Japan-China FTA.7 Furthermore, although
the prime ministers agreed that trilateral cooperation among Japan,
China, and Korea is desirable, it is still in the stage of study amongst
experts. In the future an East Asian community that includes ASEAN+3
and also Hong Kong and Taiwan is desirable. As such, it would be able
to form an economic pole equivalent to those of Europe and the
Americas. It is consistent with economic rationale. However, in reality
rapid achievement is hindered by economic gaps, remaining differences
between economic systems, a lack of experience in integration and an
historical hangover from the first half of the twentieth century among
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Japan, China, and Korea. There is no way forward other than to begin with
whatever is doable, regardless of whether it is a bilateral or multilateral
agreement. If one of these FTAs goes far ahead of the others, it will tend
to divert trade within East Asia and may become a stumbling block for the
development of East Asia as a whole. It is important for all East Asian
economies to promote individual subregional FTAs in parallel, while
sharing the ultimate goal of an East Asian FTA embracing all subregional
FTAs.8
V. Action Agenda for JACEP
Thus, the following actions will be on the agenda for JACEP:
A. Promotion of Trade and Investment
JACEP must provide all firms, indigenous and foreign, operating in the
region with a clear policy environment in which they will be players in
global competition.
Table 1.5 shows simple average applied tariffs on all goods and
transport equipment for six ASEAN members, Japan, and China. Both
Thailand and Vietnam still impose higher tariffs than China in general. On
Table 1.5
Simple Average Applied Tariff Rate
All Goods Transport Equipment
Indonesia 7.3 17.4
Malaysia 9.3 48.1
Philippines 5.3 7.9
Singapore 0.0 0.0
Thailand 18.6 26.6
Vietnam 16.2 13.2
Japan 7.7 0.1
China 12.0 17.4
Source: APEC, Individual Action Plan 2002 ‹http://www.apec-iap.org/›.
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parts and materials
Malaysia
Singapore
Philippines
Thailand
Indonesia
Assembling
transport equipment Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia give higher tariff
protection to domestic production. These are external tariffs, applied to
non-ASEAN members, including China and Japan. With the completion
of AFTA, the intra-ASEAN trade, especially among the original six
ASEAN members, will be exempted from these tariffs. It will certainly
encourage local and foreign firms operating within ASEAN to become
more active in their business across borders.
As a matter of fact, Japanese firms have already started moving in that
direction in anticipation of the completion of AFTA. Figures 1.3 and 1.4
illustrate this move. Figure 1.3 depicts conventional bilateral business
between a parent company in Japan and its subsidiary firms in individual
ASEAN economies. All parts and materials are produced in Japan and
shipped to the ASEAN subsidiaries for assembly and sale in local
markets. Their sales across borders are constrained by high tariffs, as
mentioned above. In contrast, Figure 1.4 depicts an ASEAN-wide business
network, in which the parent company allocates its production of various
parts among individual ASEAN members, gathers them in Singapore, and
makes a complete kit to be distributed to individual countries for
assembly, enabling greater economy of scale in parts production. This
requires frequent flows of parts across borders and was not viable in the
days of high tariffs.9
Figure 1.3
Traditional Procurement System
Source: Author.
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ASEAN has to accomplish AFTA as well as its related programs such
as ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) and AIA. It needs to be shown
clearly how AFTA’s Common Effective Preferential Tariffs will be applied
to Japan so that a concrete image of the integrated Japan-ASEAN market
can be shared by all business people. It needs to be predicted how bilateral
FTAs between Japan and some ASEAN members will be incorporated with
the JACEP ultimately. Furthermore, AFTA does not complete free
movement of goods across borders. Complicated customs procedures, strict
rules of origin, and regulated transport services impede free transport of
commodities. Various facilitation measures as well as liberalization are
needed.
B. Adjusting Industrial and Trade Policies of ASEAN Members
Toward the single ASEAN market, individual ASEAN member
governments need not only to reduce internal tariffs and ease restrictions
Figure 1.4
Complementary System – Denso Thailand Co., Ltd.
Source: Denso (Thailand), Co., Ltd.
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on FDI but also must adjust their industrial policies to ones based more
on market competition. Promotion of fledgling industries based on their
own comparative advantages will be allowed but only for a limited
period, after which all industries will be exposed to region-wide market
competition. That is, industrial policies at home should also be disciplined
by market competition as the AFTA is completed and applied to Japan
(and China). IDE will oversee the competitive strategy reports by six
ASEAN members10 and attempt a quantitative assessment of their trade,
FDI, and industrial policies against common measures toward the single
ASEAN market.
C. Industrial Structure Change of Japan
Japan is now implementing a variety of reform measures in public
institutions and regulations, and its industrial and corporate structures are
undergoing drastic change. This is partly in response to dynamic changes
in China and ASEAN but also reaction to changes in the two in the form
of accelerated and adjusted performance of Japanese firms. JACEP has to
be designed with the dynamic interaction of these changes taken into
consideration.
Industrial adjustment should not be overwhelmed by short-term conflict
over the interests of certain sectors. On the Japanese side, agriculture is
currently seen as the biggest barrier. Rather than worrying about how to
exclude it from FTA talks, it should be worked on positively. Let me raise
one example: In 1993 Japan’s rice crop decreased 26 percent from that of
normal years, owing to cool weather. Emergency imports of 263,000 tons
of rice were conducted for the years 1993-94. Of this amount, 42 percent
was from China, 30 percent was from Thailand, and 21 percent was from
the U.S. After that, the harvest returned to normal, and imports of rice were
reduced to minimum. However, according to agricultural experts, there is
a high probability that Japan will need to rely on substantial rice imports
every year for the next five to ten years. This is because many farmers are
reaching advanced age, and very few Japanese youth aspire to become rice
farmers. Therefore, the annual rice harvest will decrease in volume. From
where will Japan import rice to make up the shortfall?
Would it be advisable to rely on the U.S. or Australia, countries prone
to water shortages? Would it not be natural to rely on East Asian
countries, which are closer and in the same monsoon belt and manage rice
crops through small family farms? If that is the case, then Japan should
actively offer advice on agricultural management to East Asian countries,
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pressing such issues as the need to rein in excessive use of agricultural
chemicals and genetically modified seeds, solutions to water shortages, and
secure safe agricultural imports, rather than simply saying, “Importing of
rice should not be permitted”. A comprehensive FTA is a framework that
could make this type of cooperation possible. Rather than leaving
agricultural imports as a taboo and obstructing an FTA, we should use an
FTA and seek a means of sustainable reliance on agricultural imports in the
longer term. Securing safe and stable food imports should be an essential
goal of the East Asian economic community. This year Japan has had a
cool summer and can expect another poor rice harvest. We wish to see our
government seek stable supplies of rice based on imports from our
neighbors.
D. Support CLMV together with Other ASEAN Members
In addition to the specific and differential treatment of allowing longer
periods for implementation, a variety of assistance programs for CLMV
need to be implemented in order to encourage these late starters to
overcome their handicaps. ASEAN itself has designed some; however,
they are not very effective. During the 1980s Japan provided the original
ASEAN members with bilateral ODA, especially in infrastructure
building. Those ASEAN members have outgrown that assistance to be able
to do it themselves now, while Japan has been constrained severely by a
reduced ODA budget of 26 percent for the past five years, owing to its
prolonged recession. However, throughout the 1990s Japan continued its
ODA to CLMV, with emphasis shifted toward on technical assistance
rather than infrastructure building. Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) implemented new effective policy assistance programs for Vietnam
and Laos, which will be extended to Cambodia and Myanmar in the near
future.11
It is possible to expand this bilateral technical assistance given by Japan
to CLMV to include greater contribution by ASEAN, incorporating the
human resources, training facilities, skills, and experience of the original
ASEAN members. It would strengthen the solidarity of ASEAN. AMEICC
is implementing the same type of assistance program, combining Japanese
funds with human and physical resources of other ASEAN members on
a small scale.
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E. Financial Cooperation
Increased interdependence among East Asian economies through steady
expansion of trade and investment has been accompanied by rapid financial
integration in the form of increased flow of foreign capital across money
and capital markets in the region. Before the Asian crisis the dollar peg and
capital-account liberalization supported this integration process. Financial
cooperation had started to facilitate this integration but did not work in
time to prevent the crisis. Recovery from the Asian crisis basically depends
on the efforts of each country. Nevertheless, some regional financial
cooperation has been implemented to support the fragile financial systems
of ASEAN members. JACEP should incorporate this financial cooperation
into its framework.
When the crisis hit, Japan was quick to propose an Asian Monetary
Fund, but it never got off the ground, mainly because of objections from
the U.S. and China. In November 1998 the Deputy Finance Ministers
meeting agreed to the Manila Framework, later supported by the APEC
Leaders’ Declaration in Kuala Lumpur, which authorized the expansion of
a loan system to prevent the spread of the crisis and strengthen the financial
supervisory system. At the same Economic Leaders’ Meeting Japan
announced the Miyazawa Plan to give US$30 billion in support to the
crisis-hit economies. In September 2000 the APEC finance ministers in
Bandar Seri Begawan reviewed the activities of the APEC forum on
financial cooperation for the preceding year, which included a Voluntary
Action Plan for Promoting Freer and More Stable Capital Flow,
Development of Domestic Bond Markets, Bank Failure Management,
Financial Regulations Training Initiative, Strengthening Corporate
Governance, Insolvency Law, APEC Initiative on Fighting Financial
Crises, and Electronic Financial Transaction System. In addition, ASEAN
+3 met in Chiang Mai, Thailand in May 2001 and reached an agreement
on currency swaps to provide a defense against the recurrence of a similar
crisis. The agreement was designed to supplement emergency loans from
the IMF and World Bank by improving regional cooperation. In late
February 2003 the finance ministers of ASEAN+3 agreed to cooperate in
nurturing the Asian bond market. Japan proposed establishing jointly with
other members an “Asian Guarantee Organization” to warrant bonds issued
by regional firms. Its aim was to encourage regional firms to secure
long-term funds in their own currencies and reduce their dependence on the
U.S. dollar funds.
In contrast, there has not been much visible progress toward a stable
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exchange-rate regime (Figure 1.5). While most Asian currencies have been
allowed to float, the exchange-rate movement seems to require further
efforts for stabilization. These Asian currencies have tended to converge
to respective levels of depreciation from the pre-crisis levels. The
Indonesian rupiah depreciated by roughly 75 percent, the Philippine peso
by 50 percent, the Thai baht by 45 percent, the Malaysian ringgit by 35
percent, the Chinese yuan by 30 percent, and the Singaporean and
Taiwanese dollars by 20 percent. The depreciation of other Asian
currencies has certainly helped East Asian exports in the U.S. market and
contributed to their quick recovery from the crisis. Nevertheless, I am
concerned that, under the current float regime independently managed by
individual monetary authorities, another speculative run on an Asian
currency may incur a contagion to neighbor currencies and trigger
competitive devaluation, resulting in another Asian crisis.
Some form of region-wide currency arrangement seems to be needed
to assure traders and investors about exchange-rate stability in the region.
Figure 1.5
Nominal Exchange Rates of Asian Currencies against US Dollar
(1997.1=100, in US$ per own currency)
Source: Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics.
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The de facto dollar peg has proved inadequate, given the diverse trade
patterns, greater capital mobility, and inadequate monetary policies in each
country. There is no guarantee that currency-board arrangements would be
free from the same drawbacks as the pegging regime. Free floating carries
its own dangers of possible excessive volatility and free-riding risks. Some
form of managed exchange-rate system with a currency-basket peg would
seem better suited to the needs of the region. Such a system needs to be
combined with some form of currency cooperation among the U.S.
dollar, the euro, and the yen.
F. Comprehensive Economic Partnership
For successful implementation of our regional cooperation, we have to
agree on a common vision and common action agenda. We also need to
disseminate them widely so that they will be shared by many constituents
in our region. As stated above, JACEP aims at not only the liberalization
of trade and investment but also achieving in ASEAN and Japan a policy
environment conducive to attracting both indigenous and foreign firms and
achieving economic prosperity. It goes beyond the Japan-ASEAN FTA and
incorporates bilateral FTAs and APEC. It is comprehensive in that sense,
too. JACEP must provide a clear vision of the Japan-ASEAN relationship
of the future.
G. Taking Advantage of APEC
So far a wide variety of cooperative activities have been identified for
JACEP. Individual member governments are supposed to pursue most
parts of them at home by themselves. However, some of them may not be
able to do so alone, and they expect help from fellow members. Japan and
ASEAN need not institutionalize all such assistance from the beginning
but can take advantage of the APEC forum. All members of ASEAN
except for Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar participate in APEC.
Its cooperation activities are based on the principle of voluntary
participation and are not equipped with legally-binding enforcement such
as FTAs, let alone something like the tightly structured EU. Its
liberalization program has not led to much achievement, owing to a lack
of legally-binding enforcement and negotiating mandate, and only provides
technical assistance for liberalization and plays the role of a catalyst for
liberalization by maintaining momentum for liberalization in the region.
However, in facilitation, technical cooperation for structural reform, and
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financial cooperation, its forum has made progress by taking advantage of
the composition of APEC of both developed and developing members.
Under the principle of voluntary participation and flexibility, an APEC task
force is proposed and organized by one or few members and participated
in only by interested members. Even non-members are welcome to
participate.
VI. Prospects for Closer Research Institute Cooperation
IDE has developed close cooperative relationships with research institutes
in ASEAN member countries and conducted joint studies on various
development issues of our common interest for the past forty years. They
include the International Input-Output Table, the Index of Comparative
Advantage in Manufacturing, etc. We have also continued active personnel
exchanges during these years, which help us to implement this JARIM
initiative. Now we shall renew this cooperative network with JACEP. Our
cooperation with ten ASEAN research institutes has proved very useful in
conducting the present type of joint research, which requires good
information and profound understanding of individual member
economies.
Notes
1 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, “Japan and ASEAN in East
Asia––A Sincere and Open Partnership––,” January 14, 2002, Singapore.
2 AEM-METI (2002), paragraph 5.
3 Koizumi (2002).
4 This article was originally drafted and circulated to our ASEAN participants in
order to encourage them to express their perceptions of JACEP. This volume
includes ten articles on individual ASEAN participants’ views on JACEP. This
article was revised so as to incorporate figures and tables that the author prepared
for public presentation at the symposium on July 23, 2003.
5 See Hiratsuka (2003).
6 IDE-JETRO, Survey of International Competitiveness of Selected ASEAN
Industries, submitted to AMEICC in 2001.
7 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed an FTA among China, Japan and Korea at
the time of the Phnom Penh meeting, but Prime Minister Koizumi did not respond
to it eagerly.
8 For further details, see Yamazawa (2003).
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9 The ASEAN-wide network in Figure 1.4 applies to such products as electronics
and precision instruments that are light and cheap to transport. In contrast, auto
parts and other heavy products are interchanged directly on the transport carrier to
reduce transport cost. The allocation of parts to individual countries is made so as
to secure two-way transportation by ship and/or truck.
10 See Yamazawa and Hiratsuka (2003).
11 See MPI and JICA (1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999) and CPC and JICA (2002).
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